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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the West German economy to find the reason for
“Wirtschaftswunder,” the German economic miracle, and contrast the decisions made
after WWII to those made after WWI. The approaches of foreign powers in these periods
are also analyzed. After WWI, the subsequent hyperinflation and economic collapse is
mainly found to be a result of poor economic decisions within German institutions,
although the collapse was almost certainly supplemented by poor foreign policy decisions
by the Allied Powers. Wirtschaftswunder was made possible by Ludwig Erhard’s
reforms, which are found to have been much more important to West Germany’s success
and successful denazification than the Marshall Plan. The best plan for economic
recovery for Germany was one of least economic interference. In the years immediately
following WWII, the Allied Powers were extremely influential in governmental
institutions, but this was only to help stabilize the devastated country for a short period of
time after the war and help rebuild its political institutions so it could return to selfgovernance. West Germany’s economy was allowed to grow, unhindered by large
reparations payments, catching up to its productivity capacity that was never truly
eliminated by Allied bombing during the war.
Keywords: Wirtschaftswunder, Allies, Ludwig Erhard, Marshall Plan, West Germany
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Wirtschaftswunder: A Study into the Causes and Catalysts of the German Economic
Miracle
Introduction
The West German economic miracle, known as Wirtschaftswunder, was a
complete economic transformation that took place after World War II had finally come to
its conclusion. After WWII, much of Europe was in shambles. Many countries were quite
simply devastated, both in terms of economic stability and infrastructure, most notably
Poland. Germany had committed atrocities during the war previously unmatched in terms
of scale and vulgarity in the modern era. Despite this, during the 1950s, Germany found
itself as one of the world’s leading economic industrial powers, with quite favorable
quality of life, employment rates, economic stability, and median income. This could not
be more different from its post-WWI years, when the economy experienced complete
economic failure and one of the worst instances of hyperinflation in modern-day history.
In this thesis, several important questions will be addressed. The West German
economic recovery will be analyzed from several different angles and the post-WWI
German economic failure will be extensively studied to find the reasons for its collapse.
The treaties will also be investigated, showing how the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences
and the Marshall Plan aided West German recovery and also how Germany was
essentially failed by the Treaty of Versailles. In doing so, the questions of the extent to
which Germany’s post-WWI hardships were self-inflicted and the extent to which the
Treaty of Versailles can be blamed will be subsequently addressed. The main mistakes
made both internally and externally after WWI will be analyzed to show how Germany

WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER

5

and the foreign powers imposing reparations on it learned from their mistakes, along with
the pivotal actions and plans that made the West German economy so successful.
Research into this period of time has major modern-day applicability for
economic recovery. It is unrealistic to believe another war of a similar scale and with a
similar outcome cannot happen, and as a result, world economies, cities, and entire
nations may need to be rebuilt from scratch. To understand Wirtschaftswunder is to
understand how to successfully and safely repair a nation in order to alleviate the pain
and suffering of its citizens and return the region to stability, something that the world
will very likely need to do in the near future. The goal of humanity ought to be
maintaining peace and therefore promoting economic stability and recovery, both of
which are absolutely essential to sustained peace.
Initial Contrast
The post WWII West German economic success was a stark contrast to the post
WWI German economic failure. The total military casualty count of WWII has been best
estimated at 34.5 million, but at the time, there was no truly effective way to measure the
extremely high civilian casualties and PTSD had not yet been discovered and therefore
could not be included in the casualty count. As a result, the true casualty count estimates
vary greatly (US War Department, 1957). When WWI ended, the victorious Allied
Powers imposed significant reparations payments and treaties on the Central Powers, who
had already lost significant portions of their populations due to the war. The Big Four
(The United States, Italy, France, and Great Britain) determined that Germany, as the
chief instigator of the conflict, should pay and forfeit the most. Therefore, the terms of
the Treaty of Versailles were extremely harsh, forcing Germany to give up large portions
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of land (roughly 13%), demilitarization of the Rhineland, significant lowering in the
number of Germany’s military forces, a particularly demoralizing “War Guilt Clause”
(stating that Germany would accept complete and sole responsibility for the start of
WWII), and pay reparations for the full cost of all damages caused during the course of
the war (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2018). In the years following
WWI, the German economy failed in a catastrophic fashion for several reasons that will
be addressed.
In the 1950s, Germany rebounded economically both in terms of magnitude and
timeliness in ways that could never been predicted. While the 1920s were characterized
by staggering unemployment, crippling depression, unprecedented hyperinflation, and
starvation, the 1950s contained what can only be described as an industrial miracle.
Germany rebuilt with blitzkrieg-like speed, establishing itself once again as a leading
economic power in years instead of decades. This can be attributed to the completely
different approach that both West Germany and the victorious Allied Powers took to
recovery after WWII, which resulted in economic stability and an extended period of
peace.
Germany Directly After WWI
The new German government (The Weimer Republic) that came after Kaiser
Wilhelm III had fled to exile, which was in charge of representing Germany at the post
WWI peace conferences, was at a crossroads on whether to fully and publically accept
the War Guilt Clause or not. They “feared that Germany’s alleged responsibility for the
war would cause the Allies to broaden the relatively restrictive meaning of the term
‘reparations’… and serve as the basis for unlimited reparation claims” (Boemeke,
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Feldman, & Glaser, 1998, p. 48). While the War Guilt Clause would be imposed on them
regardless, choosing to not accept full responsibility for WWI could possibly soften
negotiations, making it more possible for the Fourteen Points to be imposed instead of
harsher treaties (even though, as seen, this would not be the case). This was an extremely
problematic stance for both the peace negotiation process and Germany as a whole. “In
refusing to acknowledge Germany’s “war guilt,” the new German government implicitly
exonerated the old monarchical order” (Boemeke, Feldman, & Glaser, 1998, p. 48). This
invalidated Germany’s early claim of a new democratic nation that had separated itself
from the old regime, leaving Germany without a true and established identity. It had not
fully dissociated itself from Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany due to worries that it would
invalidate the current new Weimer Republic government’s claim to rule and, in giving a
confession of guilt, provide more ammunition for the Allied powers to make the
reparations payments even more severe (Boemeke, Feldman, & Glaser, 1998, p. 48). In
refusing to willfully accept responsibility for the war and maintaining its innocence
throughout the peace process, it was impossible for the German people to ever fully
accept the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Germany were frozen; a people
economically decimated by what it saw as unjust and unfair reparations payments without
a clear dream or ideal (the new, democratic state) to move toward. Instead of receiving
closure with the acceptance of wrongdoing, the German people were overwhelmed with a
sense of anger and injustice.
The Treaty of Versailles was shown to be flawed in both a moral and legal sense,
and famed British economist John Maynard Keynes’ The Economic Consequences of
Peace further highlighted its abundance of flaws, most notably how impossible it would
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be for the German economy to recover under the conditions imposed on it by the Treaty.
An open critique of the Treaty opened the door for possible revisions at a later date, but
also gave the German people even more reason to feel, without a shadow of a doubt, that
there was injustice. Keynes was a staunch critic of the peace conference from the start.
He stated that Wilson’s Fourteen Points, while maybe well intentioned, completely
ignored the harsh economic realities of post-war recovery. He also stated that Versailles’
harsh burdens and land cessions imposed on Germany “threatened Europe’s entire
financial equilibrium. Such economic strangulation also threatened to prolong needlessly
European recovery from war” (Boemeke, Feldman, & Glaser, 1998, p. 191). Keynes’
concerns were not solely about German recovery, but about Europe as a whole.
Eliminating the purchasing and industrial capabilities of one of Europe’s strongest
powers would have consequences for the entire continent, which also needed to rebuilt.
Instead of providing more capital for nations to rebuild, which was its so-called intention,
sizeable reparations payments without a manageable payment plan actually starved
Europe of purchasing power and production that it needed more at that time than ever
before. The reparations payments arrived in three sets in the year 1921. The first set, the
A bonds, amounted to 12 billion marks, which compiled 20% of Germany’s 1913 (which
was, by all accounts, an extremely productive year for the German economy). The second
set, the B bonds, accounted for 38 billion marks, or 100% of the GDP for that year. The
final set, the C bonds, were valued at 82 billion marks (260% of 1913 GDP), although the
C bonds were, in all actuality, recognized by both sides as never actually going to be paid
(Crafts & Fearon, 2013, p. 113).
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A bond between Germany and the United States was formed quite early in the
peace process following WWI. While the European contingent of the Big Four desired to
impose the heaviest possible reparations payments on Germany, US President Woodrow
Wilson initially desired a much more manageable plan for Germany that would allow for
foreseeable economic recovery. Wilson’s main desire for after WWI was a sustainable
peace throughout Europe, led by a soon-to-be-formed League of Nations. This plan was
outlined in Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which was later thrown out at the peace process in
favor of harsher treaty terms for Germany. While the Fourteen Points were deemed too
ideological by many economists, including Keyes, Germany still recognized the effort by
the United States to attempt to aid Germany in its rebuilding. This later paved the way for
a strong trade and loan partnership in the 1920s between Germany and the United States
in an attempt to assist in the recovery of the German economy and help it pay back its
reparations debts to Europe (Boemeke, Feldman, & Glaser, 1998, p. 47).
Hyperinflation and Economic Failure within Germany
The German economic crash of 1923 had its beginnings in WWI. In 1914, at the
outbreak of the war, Germany departed from the gold standard, which is not uncommon
for countries at war (Graham, 1930, p. 19). In order to finance the war, instead of taxing
its people higher, it borrowed large amounts with the help of the Reichsbank in the form
of bonds. The treasury than began printing money at higher rates to pay back these dues;
money that was no longer backed by the gold standard. As a result, “A growing
percentage of government debt… found its way into the vaults of the central bank and an
equivalent amount of printing press money into people's cash holdings. In short, the
central bank was monetizing the growing government debt” (Sennholz, 2006). Due to
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wartime expenditures and necessary production, both prices and money in circulation
rose steadily in Germany from 1914-1918, which is not unusual for a country during
wartime. By the time that the armistice was signed, the amount of money in circulation in
Germany had risen fourfold and prices increased by roughly 140% (Sennholz, 2006).
While this certainly does not mean that high levels of inflation would be certain or even
probable in the years following WWI (economic actions could have easily been taken to
offset this), this should have been a worrying sign for the Federal Ministry of Finance in
Germany. However, this was simply dismissed and largely ignored by many in the
German government, as were the other signs of inflation in Germany. After the war, the
German government continued to print money in order to pay expenses, workers, and
make reparations payments. Germany desperately needed gold and strong foreign
currency, which it did not have. In December of 1923, only five years after the war had
ended, the German bank had issued an incredible total of 496.5 quintillion marks, which
had diluted the German mark to 1-trillionth of its value in 1914, resulting in one of the
greatest recorded instances of hyperinflation in history (Sennholz, 2006). During
November of 1923, 42 billion marks were worth roughly one American cent (Graham,
1930, p. 4).
During the years preceding 1923, many in the German government did not
recognize the growing danger of inflation. In the early 20s, the German Finance Minister
Karl Helfferich concluded that there was in fact no inflation in Germany “since the total
value in circulation, when measured in gold, was covered by the gold reserves in the
Reichsbank at a much higher ratio than before the war” (Sennholz, 2006). This was
further cemented by the president of the Reichsbank at the time, Rudolf Havenstein. In a
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pre-crash study done by the Statistical Bureau of the German Government, it was found
that “there was a shortage of currency in Germany, but a great deal of inflation abroad,”
stating that Germany’s financial state was under control (Sennholz, 2006). The
government argued that although there was a growing amount of money issued, the real
value of the currency in circulation was relatively low. This logic and reasoning gave the
Germans authorization to continue printing more money to cover its expenses and pay
back its debts. Directly after the war, they devoted exorbitant amounts of money for
health, education, and other public expenses (money that Germany did not have) in an
effort to repair the infrastructure of its country and provide jobs for its many returning
soldiers. Government expenses skyrocketed, and taxes alone could never cover the
expenses, as many of its citizens were already either financially struggling or
impoverished as a result of the devastation that resulted from WWI. Initially, when the
Weimer Republic was established in 1919 and a new Constitution was written up in
1920, there was a tax plan put into place that seemed to be quite strong; a firm tax bracket
was successfully implemented along with a stronger and more centralized tax collection
system. Inflation was actually stopped for a short period of time. However, when news of
the actual extent of the reparations broke out, which was much larger than the German
people had initially predicted, a “veritable tax boycott developed. Tax collection
plummeted, the monetization of short-term government paper resumed, and inflation
accelerated again” (Crafts & Fearon, 2013, p. 113). Inflation was happening faster than
the rate of taxing; in fact, in the time between when the taxable transaction occurred and
the date of the actual tax payment, the value of the tax was useless. Therefore, the
government printed even more money at an even faster rate to combat the lack of tax
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revenue. From 1914 to 1923, only a meager 15% of the government’s expenses were
covered by taxes. In October of 1923, this number had dropped to a staggering 0.8%
(Sennholz, 2006). The German government had found itself in a cycle that it was unable
to escape.
Foreign Occupation of the Ruhr
Another contributing factor to economic devastation was the French and Belgian
occupation of the Ruhr that began in latter part of 1922 and early 1923 (Crafts & Fearon,
2013, p. 113). This was an action unsupported by many of the Allied creditors, including
the United States and Britain (Sennholz, 2006). The Ruhr was a resource rich land in
western Germany with extremely high production and manufacturing potential, with
many of Germany’s factories and other parts of their supply chains, including several rich
coal mines, located there. In the mind of the French and Belgian governments, taking full
control of the Ruhr and its abundance of resources would help contribute to the unpaid
reparations and help their respective economies recover (The Wiener Library for the
Study of the Holocaust and Genocide, 2018). This proved to be a completely
counterproductive strategy. Instead of bringing a steady supply of capital into the French
and Belgian economies, this furthered hindered Germany from being able to pay off its
substantial reparations debts and therefore starved the Allies of much-needed reparations.
German workers refused to work under the foreign French and Belgian occupation,
choosing to develop and maintain a policy of passive resistance. This was encouraged by
the German government, who continued to pay the workers, even though there was zero
productive output from that region. Financing the German workers in their program of
passive resistance was a costly process funded mostly with discounted treasury bills
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(Graham, 1930, p. 10). This led to a substantial decrease in German productivity and
GDP and contributed even more to the ever-growing increase in governmental
expenditures in addition to inflation.
Refusal to Accept Responsibility
A large portion of the government and scholarly contingent of Germany refused
to accept responsibility for the hyperinflation and economic failure; it continued to assert
that the hyperinflation that was occurring was a result of the reparations that the Treaty
imposed, not because of the poor economic and fiscal decisions made by the government.
The government continued contributing the current position it was in to the Allies instead
of accepting internal responsibility, which contributed to the ease to which Adolf Hitler
rose to power a decade later. They acted as if the position they were in was inevitable,
continuing to hold to the idea that the government made the correct decisions. However,
according to Hans Sennholz, a former Professor of Economics at Grove City College and
President of the Foundation for Economic Education, Germany’s economic errors can be
almost exclusively attributed to poor internal fiscal and policy decisions made within the
German government. Sennholz states that although Germany blamed the Treaty of
Versailles for its economic problems, the reparations payments in and of themselves did
not necessitate crippling hyperinflation. The value of money and excessive reparations
payments are completely independent of each other. There will be a favorable balance of
payments that will objectively occur when there is a reduction of currency in the central
bank (due to the purchase of gold or other foreign exchange from the central bank to the
treasury for the government), as long as the country is still moderately productive. This
favorable balance of payments drops the price of goods, incentivizing other countries to
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purchase goods from that country, therefore introducing relatively strong foreign
currency to the economy, while simultaneously discouraging imports (because of the low
price of goods). “In short, there can be no shortage of gold or foreign exchange as long as
the central bank refrains from inflation and monetary depreciation” (Sennholz, 2006).
While this may arguably be an oversimplified model that does not take into account the
full magnitude of the economic stress Germany was under at the time, the basic principle
still holds true.
Havenstein also pointed to speculators at home and abroad as the reason the
German financial market failed, calling it an “attack” by other countries, and many other
established figures in the German economic community echoed this. This theory was
introduced to the public through newspapers and other forms of media and was widely
spread throughout the German public (Sennholz, 2006). Interestingly enough, speculators
in Germany that were villainized by German hierarchy were actually preserving their
capital and the capital of the society as a whole; the German government was the one
wiping it out. There was also a “flight of capital” from Germany, which occurred when
German citizens and those elsewhere invested abroad instead of Germany, recognizing
correctly that the excessive printing of money was unsustainable and would result in
economic failure. While Havenstein blamed foreign entities for Germany’s economic
devastation, foreign governments had lost significant amounts as a result of the
hyperinflation as well. “According to various authoritative estimates, foreign individuals
and banks bought at least sixty billion paper marks which the Reichsbank had floated
abroad at an average price of one-fourth gold mark for a paper mark. The depreciation of
the mark to one-trillionth of its earlier value repudiated these foreign claims to German
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goods. Thus foreigners suffered losses of some fifteen billion gold marks, or some $3.5
billion US dollars, which was eight times more than Germany had paid in foreign
exchange on account of reparations” (Sennholz, 2006).
External Reasons for Hyperinflation
While almost every notable scholar agrees that the fiscal decisions made during
the early 1920s were the main contributors to the German economy’s collapse, others
point to excessive reparations and specific decisions made by the Allied powers as key
contributing factors to the economic demise of the German economy. As previously
stated, Keynes was one of the staunchest critics of the Treaty from the start, critiquing it
for both its moral and economic qualities. Keynes correctly stated that the rest of
Europe’s recovery would be directly linked to Germany’s recovery, and if the German
economy failed due to excessive limitations and reparations placed on them by the
Treaty, they would be unable to pay off their sizeable debts. This would severely limit the
purchasing power and production capabilities of Germany and Europe as a whole. It is
also important to make note of Germany’s financial position before the reparations
payments were imposed. When the strong new tax plan was instituted by the Weimer
Republic in 1920, inflation was halted for a time and the economy looked as if it would
recover quickly and steadily (Crafts & Fearon, 2013, p. 146). However, when the high
reparation amounts were announced, inflation skyrocketed once again. More feasible
reparations payments and a manageable and clear reparations payment plan could have
assisted Germany in stopping its steadily rising inflation. The French and Belgian
occupation of the Ruhr also should be noted as stunting the German economy. In taking
over the factories and mines in the area, the occupation severely limited German
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productivity and output, making it even more difficult for Germany to pay back its
reparations, forcing it to print more money.
Economic Recovery and Post-Hyperinflation
To combat German hyperinflation and ensure that the German economy could
recover in order to pay back its reparations, the Reparation Commission met in 1923 to
reevaluate Germany’s reparation payments. Led by Charles G. Dawes and other
representatives of the Allied Powers, the Dawes Plan was introduced in 1924. The Dawes
Plan aligned Germany’s reparation payments with the state of its economy; initially, the
reparations payments would be very low to reflect Germany’s economic state (which at
this time was extremely poor). As Germany’s economy began to regain strength, its
reparations payments would rise in proportion to its economic prosperity. It was stated
that foreign officials would supervise economic policy and decision making. France and
Belgium were asked to evacuate the Ruhr in order to stimulate manufacturing and
production in German industry. The biggest part of the Dawes Plan, however, was the
$200 million loan from the Allies to help bolster the German economy. This plan proved
to be incredibly helpful for Germany, so much so that Charles Dawes received the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1925 (Office of the Historian, 2018).
Over the course of the war, the US lent over $10 billion to the European Allied
powers; debts that it fully planned on recovering. The US continued to loan Germany
money from 1924-1929 to help it pay back its reparation debts to the Allied powers.
From the US perspective, as Germany paid back its debts to Europe, the European Allies
would then be able to pay back the United States. As a result, the US invested millions
into the German economy in hopes that as Germany became more stable, the US would
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begin to recover the $10 billion it lent to Europe during the war. Due to the stabilization
and adjustment that occurred as a result of the US loans, the German economy was able
to experience recovery led by large short-term loans. The Dawes Plan actually
encouraged Germany to continue borrowing large amounts of strong foreign currency
(Office of the Historian, 2018). With the aid and recommendations of the US, Germany
began paying its reparations on credit from foreign loans, including the initially $200
million loan and subsequent US loans throughout the 20s. This later would be dubbed
“the transfer problem” and would prove to be harmful for both Germany and the US.
This plan was extremely successful for German recovery until the Great
Depression hit in 1929. While the German industrial production and the German
economy as a whole were doing much better as a result of the Dawes Plan, there was a
fatal flaw in the plan that was shown in 1929. In accepting the American loans, Germany
was effectively staking its economy’s future on the strength of the American economy
and the influx of strong foreign currency that it was receiving as a result of the Dawes
Plan (Office of the Historian, 2018). During the 20s, the American economy was
extremely successful, with high levels of economic prosperity and relatively low
unemployment. The housing and stock markets were both very strong as well, and the
loans seemed to be a relatively safe and stable source of cash flows. Germany steadily
developed an incredibly high current account deficit. However, when the US stock
market failed, it began to recall the loans and stopped loaning money to Germany.
Without the loans, which had been propping up the German economy for years, German
businesses failed. German unemployment once again hit extremely high numbers.
According to the Wiener Library for the Study of the Holocaust and Genocide, the
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world’s oldest archive on the Nazi era, unemployment reached six million in 1932,
although this number was much closer to nine million due to the fact that millions of
citizens were also unemployed but were unable to register for the work force (The
Wiener Library for the Study of the Holocaust and Genocide, 2018).
Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers Party took advantage of
the difficult position Germany was in during the Great Depression. Unemployment was
at levels never before seen in Germany during the modern era. Businesses were failing on
a large scale and starvation and homelessness were serious problems for the German
government. Crime was also an issue, as people resorted to drastic measures in order to
survive. Due to the lack of accountability and responsibility in the Germany after WWI,
these issues were considered by the greater German population to be direct and
unavoidable consequences of unfair and horrific reparations imposed on them by the
Allied forces. As a result, there was a deep-seeded anger and frustration in the country,
coupled with intense desperation. Hitler recognized this anger and channeled it towards
actual productive goals. He gave the German people an outlet in the form of a group of
people to use as a real, tangible target for their frustrations. He showed a public disdain
for the Treaty of Versailles, which he characterized as unjust, unfair, and corrupt, further
cementing the idea that Germany was not to blame for the position they were currently in.
He promised that, with the help of the German people, he would rebuild the economy and
the German military. He once again gave people a sense of nationalism and a belief in a
strong, proud, new German state. He promised jobs for the unemployed, food and
clothing for the starving, and revenge on the people that had put Germany in this
position. He later went on to start another World War, engage in widespread genocide
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and ethnic cleansing processes that almost eradicated an entire people group, and cause
the deaths of millions of innocent men, women, and children.
Post WWI Summary and Conclusion
To summarize, there were serious errors made by both the Allied powers in the
years during and following the Treaty of Versailles and the German finance department
that led to hyperinflation and unemployment in Germany. On the Allied side, the Treaty
of Versailles contained reparations that Germany could never have paid back, creating
large amounts of debt. The payments severely restricted the possibility of economic
success as the German economy suffered from unnecessary Allied interference. This debt
was not accompanied by an effective payment plan and proper assistance from the Allied
powers. With a realistic payment plan that mirrored German economic health, inflation
may have been kept under control. After all, despite the fact that it was objectively to
blame for the majority of the outbreak of WWI, Germany was itself a nation devastated
by war attempting to recover. Assistance in the payment of its debts to help Germany
recover and stimulate its economy would have actually allowed for the payment of more
reparations and would help those other countries that desperately needed the reparations
payments and Germany’s industry and purchasing power in order to recover. This was
displayed by the Dawes Plan which, although it was hindered by the outbreak of the
Great Depression, greatly assisted the German economy and Europe as a whole from the
years 1924-1929 (Office of the Historian, 2018). Had the plan been instituted directly
after the war, it is entirely possible that many of the poor decisions made by the Germans
could have been avoided. The occupation of the Ruhr also further hindered German
economic recovery and industry and was objectively a poor decision by the Allied
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powers. There was also a failure to recognize, as Keynes stated, that Europe’s recovery
was directly related to the economy of Germany. As stated earlier, Europe desperately
needed Germany’s purchasing power and strong industrial potential in order to fully
recover. In placing restrictions on German economy growth, all of Europe was therefore
restricted as well. The German economy failed, making it much more difficult for the
continent as a whole to recover.
However, although Germany was certainly not assisted by the decisions made by
the Allies immediately after the war, the actual hyperinflation that caused the economy to
crumble was more of a byproduct of the decisions made within the German government.
The decisions made in the Treaty of Versailles did not necessitate hyperinflation, and
therefore the responsibility for the German hyperinflation and economic crash lies almost
solely with the German government (Sennholz, 2006). During the war, under the
assumption they would win, the German government borrowed large amounts instead of
raising taxes to higher rates, relying almost solely on debt to finance wartime
expenditures. The amount of money in circulation also rose along with the government
debt. Moving from the gold standard during the war meant that the German mark was no
longer backed by gold, opening the mark up to the possibility of inflation. Germany was
unable to return to it after the war due to their initial reparations payments, so although
their currency was in danger of inflating, they continued printing money at an exorbitant
rate rather than attempt to limit the amount of currency in circulation. The government
financed large public health and infrastructure expenditures in order to create jobs
without an effective tax system to finance these expenditures. Helfferich, Havenstein, and
others that continued to incorrectly assert that there was no hyperinflation in Germany.
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They paid workers in the Ruhr to strike with money they did not have when it was under
foreign occupation (Sennholz, 2006). Another crippling error occurred after the war
under the Dawes Plan, in which Germany initially recovered by staking their economic
success on the success of the American economy. Instead of moving to be self-sufficient
in the years before the Great Depression, they relied on the loans from the US to prop up
the economy. When the stock market crashed and the US recalled the loans instead of
supplying them, the German economy failed once again, experiencing extremely high
levels of unemployment. Frank D. Graham, Professor of Economics at Princeton from
1921-1945, states the following about the German post-WWI financial turmoil:
While the payments of cash reparations in 1921 undoubtedly played an
important part in promoting the decline in the currency, and while the
sanctions imposed on Germany in 1923 led to the ultimate collapse, this is,
of course, by no means the whole story. It is true that, if a more soundly
conceived and executed reparations policy had been adopted by the
creditor Powers, inflation of the currency might perhaps have been stayed
by the vigorous measures of reform of the public finances initiated in
Germany in 1920. But inflation had none the less proceeded far before any
cash reparations whatever had been paid and it was accelerated after they
had been entirely suspended… it was, in many German quarters, nurtured
rather than repressed (Graham, 1930, p. 10).
The Treaty of Versailles contained reparations payments that would have made
economic success very difficult, but the Treaty’s provisions did not necessitate economic
failure. The economic failure was caused by a lack of understanding about inflation, a
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poor and unenforced tax plan, large amounts of debt, and a lack of strong economic
reforms to stimulate production and industry. In continuing to monetize the growing
government debt, Germany’s currency became more and more unstable. Without a strong
currency to work for, Germany’s workforce and businesses became unmotivated, both to
work for and sell for weak currency. Germany’s productivity and production levels
dropped greatly and businesses could not remain stimulated. Germany’s internal
monetary policy was horrific, and in continuing to print money without backing it, its
currency became worthless, making it impossible to pay off its debts both to its people
and to foreign powers. In recovering from WWII, Germany would have to make
significant changes to its monetary policy in order to make sure that the mistakes it made
were not repeated.
World War II Introduction
After World War II, Germany was in a similar position as it was post-WWI. They
had been defeated in another global world war that had left an extremely high death count
on both sides. Its infrastructure and several notable cities, most notably Dresden and
Berlin, had suffered significant damage. Over 20% of all housing in Germany had been
destroyed. Food production per capita in 1947 was just 51% of its 1938 levels. Industrial
output in 1947 was merely a third of its 1938 levels and a large percentage of Germany’s
working-age men were killed or permanently wounded and unable to work (Henderson,
2018). The hyperinflation and economic collapse were still fresh in the minds of the
German citizens after WWII, as many of them were alive to experience the full extent of
the crash at that time. The problem did not just boil down to poor economic decisions,
although those were certainly prevalent. There was also a cultivated and complete lack of
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accountability and responsibility within the German government, an incorrect perception
of inflation and how it worked, an ineffective tax system, irresponsible government
spending (with money it did not have), an overreliance on foreign countries and foreign
currency, and an extreme amount of debt. There were also problems with the Allies, as
they recognized that eliminating the purchasing power and reducing the economic
stability of one of Europe’s most powerful nations affected all of Europe as a whole.
Destabilizing a nation also opened the door for volatility and political instability.
Changes needed to be made across the board in order to make sure that the mistakes
made post-WWI were not repeated.
WWII Conferences and Plans for Germany
Yalta
The Yalta Conference took place in February of 1945, when Allied Victory
against Germany was all but guaranteed. Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Franklin
D. Roosevelt met in the USSR to discuss how they would effectively go about ending the
war with minimal casualties and what post-war actions they would take to punish
Germany and rebuild Europe, but their main focus was the unconditional surrender of
Germany. It was agreed that upon its surrender, Germany would be split into 4
occupational zones controlled by the US, Britain, France, and the USSR (UNC Center for
European Studies, 2018). Yalta was the precursor to the longer and larger conference,
Potsdam, that took place after Germany had officially surrendered, and many of the plans
for Germany that were implemented after the Potsdam Conference had their beginnings
at Yalta, including denazification, reparations payments, and the staffing of the German
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government, along with plans for rebuilding the devastated Polish state and Europe’s
infrastructure.
Potsdam
The Potsdam Conference officially took place from July 17th to August 2nd, 1945,
after Germany had officially surrendered on May 7 (UNC Center for European Studies,
2018). While the overarching goal was achieving a period of sustained peace, the main
focus of Potsdam was defining and implementing a long-term plan for Germany to
promote economic stability, repay war reparations, and to make sure they would not
instigate another World War in the future. The plan was fourfold, involving the
decentralization, demilitarization, denazification, and democratization of Germany. It was
decided that the land aggressively taken under Hitler’s rule would be returned to its prewar ownership, and a portion of Germany’s land on its eastern border would be forfeited,
resulting in the harsh relocation and exile of hundreds of thousands of Germans living in
what would later become Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. There would also be a
complete transformation of the West German economy that would starkly contrast the
Treaty of Versailles and sanctions placed on Germany after WWI. In the years preceding
WWII, Germany’s economic success and stability could be accounted to wartime
industry and heavy levels of production. Rather than eliminating much of their industrial
and economic capabilities, as after WWI, it sought to transform it and maintain some sort
of economic strength. Germany would move to a nation characterized by more efficient
agriculture and light domestic industry (UNC Center for European Studies, 2018). West
Germany was later established in May 1949. East Germany followed in October of 1949
West Germany, made up of the English, French, and American occupied zones,
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developed a strong capitalist democracy with a market economy. East Germany became
communist under direct and centralized Soviet influence.
The Potsdam Conference necessitated a complete shift in German education,
industry, economic policy, and the mindset of the German people. As a result of the
unconditional surrender, as stated in the official Potsdam Conference report released to
Germany, the German people would be fully and wholeheartedly convinced that their
current hardships were a direct result of their own actions and the actions of the Nazi
Regime (Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government (USSR, UK, and USA),
2008, p. 2). Germany would not be able to escape responsibility as it had attempted to do
after WWI. German administrative and economic controls were implemented by the
Allied powers, but only to the extent necessary to develop a balanced economy and make
sure that Germany could not develop war potential. Most of the control, however, would
later be given to the German people in order to further cement that they were responsible
for their own economic success and prosperity or failure after World War II. There were
strict restrictions placed on Germany’s wartime industries:
In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of
arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of
aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented.
Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that
are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled
and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs.
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(Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government (USSR,
UK, and USA), 2008, p. 11).
However, other parts of the industry would be stimulated (those that were not
necessary to war and militarization) to help make up for the reduction in wartime
industries, and Allied control would only be taken as necessary to disarm, demilitarize,
and collect reparations. Concrete goals were set to maximize agricultural output in the
several years following the cessation of WWII in order to make sure there was enough
food for the German people and the occupying forces (Berlin Conference of the Three
Heads of Government (USSR, UK, and USA), 2008, p. 7). Transportation infrastructure
would be repaired so citizens could work, coal production would be stimulated to offset
the subsequent energy crisis (inevitable after WWII), and housing and utilities would be
repaired as soon as possible. Allied economic and planning assistance would be granted
to make sure that Germany maintained an adequate average living standard for its
citizens that would match the average living standard of the United Kingdom and the
United States.
There was also a plan set in place regarding Germany’s reparations payments
from WWII in addition to the existing WWI payments. The long term reparations would
still be substantial, but there was a different approach taken than in the years following
World War I; reparations would be collected, but only enough as to not hinder Germany
from being able to function without the constant assistance of external powers. The
reparations payment plans were stretched out and much more flexible than after WWI,
and payments were designed to mirror the German economic conditions and strength at
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that time. Limits were set to assure that Germany would not be allowed to spend more
than 5% of its export revenues to pay back its debt in order to assure that its economy
would have the cash necessary to recover (Toussaint, 2006). Germany would be taught to
be independent and self-sufficient as reasonably and practically possible. As Germany
would still require imports in order to survive and stimulate the economy, the amount
needed to cover the payments for these necessary imports would be provided in an
assortment of forms by the Allied Powers (mainly the United Kingdom and the United
States) if not able to be paid by Germany. However, the long-term goal was to reduce the
reliance on imports and stimulate internal production of goods, services, and materials
not essential for militarization across the 4 occupation zones. The German government
and administrative agencies, on both a local and national scale, would be stabilized and
engineered for success for a future democratic and peaceful nation, one day in the future
disassociated with the countries that at that time had ultimate control over the occupation
zones (Toussaint, 2006). They sought decentralization of governmental power across all
local governmental agencies, and as a result there would be a delay in establishing a
Central and ruling German government in order to build up the lower levels of the
German government (except for those governmental programs that were absolutely
essential for aiding German recovery at the time). Perhaps the most important task,
though, was destroying the Nazi institutions that had taken control of the German people
in the 30s and 40s and changing the mindset of the German population. Long-term
sustained assurances were taken to make sure that the Nazi regime and mindset were
unable to be revived in the future, which involved changing school criteria, changing the
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intense feelings of racial superiority towards minorities, and erasing Nazi ideologies from
the minds of the German people.
Marshall Plan
The German economy was also assisted greatly by the Marshall Plan, which is
commonly acknowledged as one of America's greatest achievements of the twentieth
century (Brainard, 2007). Implemented in 1948, its goal was to assist in rebuilding
Europe in the form of aid given over the course of four years as well as stopping the
spread of Communism to the European countries that had been substantially weakened by
the war (Office of the Historian, 2017). As shown so clearly in the years following WWI,
Secretary of State George Marshall and President Truman both recognized that any
recovery of Western Europe was impossible without the recovery of West Germany. As
stated by historian Manfred Knapp, “America’s decision to include West Germany in the
Marshall Plan was due primarily to its desire to allow Germany to make its indispensable
contribution to the success of the reconstruction and the stabilization of the system of
Western European industrial states” (Knapp, Stolper, & Hudson, 1981, p. 418). The
Marshall Plan resulted in over $12 billion in aid distributed to Western Europe, with
Germany being one of the largest recipients, taking roughly 11% of the $12 billion
(Office of the Historian, 2017). This resulted in substantial foreign investment in the
West German economy and allowed for the further stimulation of domestic industry and
the repairing of their broken infrastructure (highways, hospitals, power lines, etc.). Other
countries profited as well; between the years of 1948 and 1951, those that accepted aid
experienced an estimated rise in GNP by at least 15-25%. The Marshall Plan contributed
to the successful reuniting of Western Europe by fostering trade and creating economic
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interdependencies amongst its member nations. Secretary of State George Marshall, the
engineer of the Marshall Plan, later received the Nobel Prize for peace and remains the
only general in history to do so (Office of the Historian, 2017). The Marshall Plan is
viewed as a turning point for American engagement abroad and its success has
permanently altered American foreign policy.
West German Growth and Years Following WWII
West Germany experienced extreme economic growth in the 1950s that surpassed
the economic growth of every other European nation in that time period. Between 1950
and 1959, GDP rose by roughly 8% annually. In Europe, only Austria came even
remotely close to matching this growth. Living standards in West Germany doubled in
that decade, and by the early 1960s, under 20 years after the war had ceased, West
Germany was the largest financial and economic power in Europe (Ritschl &
Eichengreen, 2009, p. 192). By 1958, industrial production was over four times the
annual rate at the beginning of 1948 and industrial production per capita was over 200%
higher (Henderson, 2018). This was even more incredible when compared with
Germany’s post WWI struggles and economic collapse. Germany was suffering from
problems after WWII similar to its state after WWI, most notably a drop in productivity
and destruction of its infrastructure. However, its economic growth and efficiency could
not have been more different.
Many scholars argue that the notable decline of output, productivity, and
efficiency in the German economy at the end of the war and during the years immediately
following was what allowed for such a rapid increase in growth simply because of postwar shock: Germany began to regain access to its full capacity and increase its
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productivity after the fighting had ceased, which historians Eichengreen and Ritschl
argue was vastly more important than the structural changes Germany made in the years
following WWII and the assistance in recovery lent by the Potsdam Conference and
Marshall Plan (Ritschl & Eichengreen, 2009, p. 193). Germany experienced significant
negative output shock during the end of the war and in the years immediately following
it. Between the years 1944 and 1946, output in what would soon become West Germany
fell annually by 38%, despite a 20% rise in West German population, making an even
more severe annualized 47% decline of per capita output a truer reflection (Ritschl &
Eichengreen, 2009, pp. 198-199). There was a decline in German total factor productivity
(TFP) of 69% between 1944 and 1946, as opposed to a cumulative decline in British TFP
of 12% (which was still considered substantial) (Ritschl & Eichengreen, 2009, p. 199). In
1948, the 3 Allied zones of occupation that would later become West Germany had a
GDP of merely 64% of its 1938 level. When contrasted with the UK, where output was
13% higher than its 1938 during 1948, this becomes even more drastic. Quite simply, the
larger the drop in output that a country experienced during and after WWII, the faster it
grew in the years following as it regained its composure and repaired its infrastructure
and its workforce productivity. The reasoning for this can oddly enough be illustrated by
an analysis of Allied bombing techniques.
Beginning in mid-1944, Allied bombing changed its tactics to
maximize damage to bottleneck sectors of the German economy
(see Birkenfeld 1964; Budraß 1998). Bombing now targeted
electric power, synthetic fuels generation, and the railroad
network. Rather than destroying productive capacity, it simply

WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER

31

disrupted the supply chain—most prominently supplies of coal,
which were now much harder to get from the pithead to the power
station and factory (Ritschl & Eichengreen, 2009, p. 199).
German productive capacity was never truly eliminated by bombing; although key
areas of the country had been destroyed and others areas taken from them after the war,
there were still intact factories, fertile farmland, and industrialized cities, especially in
West Germany. There were many other wartime efforts by the Allied forces to target
German bottleneck sectors, showing that Germany was merely temporarily pushed off
their growth path that they continued on after the war had ended. West German industrial
capacity was still extremely high, estimated during 1944 to have been at over 35% higher
than during 1936 (Ritschl & Eichengreen, 2009, p. 196). It was just unable to be accessed
due to shortages of raw materials and energy (notably coal, which in West Germany in
1947 was at 52% of its 1938 levels). This continued into the later months of 1947.
Having lower amounts for each reparations payment and an extended payment plan
allowed for more money to be invested in the quick repair of German infrastructure and
the bottleneck sectors that the Allies had destroyed, which when coupled by a rise in
employment and worker productivity, allowed Germany to regain the output and
productivity that it had momentarily lost during the end of the war and in the year
immediately following its surrender. However, this is not to minimalize the German
economic miracle, especially when compared to the German economy after WWI.
Despite their research, a quite legitimate and popular reason in scholarly circles
for the ability of the economy to rebound so quickly boils down to monetary reforms and
changes in socioeconomic institutions after WWII, supportered strongly by Mancur
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Olson’s model of the capture of policy by distributional coalitions (Ritschl &
Eichengreen, 2009, p. 193). The German economy encouraged corporatist organizations
and industry with the help of US officials as it attempted to move from a society largely
dependent on peasant agriculture to non-wartime industry and more efficient and more
modern large-scale agriculture. It also instituted pro-market reforms, which allowed for
more free trade and businesses to flourish in a competitive environment rich in human
capital and resources. This brought it economically closer to the rest of Europe, fostering
trade across the globe.
The most important of these economic programs and reforms were implemented
by economist Ludwig Erhard. Robert A. Peterson and David R. Henderson are two of the
many scholars that attribute Ludwig Erhard’s free market reforms with beginning
Wirtschaftswunder and freeing the potential of the German economy. A graduate of the
University of Frankfurt, Erhard was a strong advocate for free market economies,
rejecting Nazism and bureaucratic state planning of the economy. He would later be
appointed as Minister of Economic Affairs and Chancellor of West Germany as a result
of the success of his economic programs. As director of the Office of Economic
Opportunity and advisor to General Lucius D. Clay, military governor of the US zone of
occupation, Erhard proposed total currency reform during 1947 that was later instituted
on June 20, 1948 with the help of Allied control. “The basic idea (of the currency reform)
was to substitute a much smaller number of deutschemarks (DM), the new legal currency,
for reichsmarks. The money supply would thus contract substantially so that even at the
controlled prices, now stated in deutschemarks, there would be fewer shortages”
(Henderson, 2018). This resulted in an over 90% contraction in the money supply in an
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effort to control inflation. The importance of this currency reform cannot be overstated;
in implementing currency reform, Erhard ensured the stability of deutschemarks and
safeguarded the economy against the hyperinflation that had so recently devastated it.
Erhard also eliminated all price controls and rationing regulations in an effort to deNazify the economy and further embrace free-market principles, which initially went
against the Allied Control Authority’s initial economic plan. This contributed to
incentivizing the depressed German workforce and businesses (Peterson). The currency
reform and elimination of price controls went hand-in-hand; “Decontrol of prices allowed
buyers to transmit their demands to sellers, without a rationing system getting in the way,
and the higher prices gave sellers an incentive to supply more” (Henderson, 2018). This
allowed for the self-correction of inflated prices and for the market to begin to stabilize
itself. In the simplest of terms, the currency reform attacked inflation and the elimination
of price controls ended repression. Erhard also supported the cutting of extremely high
wartime tax rates, further stimulating businesses and corporations by putting more money
in the pockets of the German people.
There was a notable shift in the German economy after Erhard’s currency reform
and elimination of price controls were instituted. Absenteeism plummeted as the price
and rationing controls that had de-incentivized the stagnant workforce were eliminated,
boosting workforce participation rates immediately (Henderson, 2018). Food shortages
also ended; shops were immediately filled as owners began to understand the value of the
new German currency. The German middle class began to rapidly grow as a result of the
low tax rates and better jobs. In the 50s and 60s, unemployment was extremely low, the
standard of living was high, educational opportunities were affordable and abundant,
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West German industrial output continued to grow, and Western Europe became more and
more economically cohesive, opening up opportunities for international trade and
economic stimulation in strong economies.
These initial economic growth and trade opportunities in the early 1950s were
stimulated by Germany becoming further integrated with the rest of Western Europe. Due
to economic reforms and the necessary of export markets to provide the demand needed
to access its full productivity levels, Germany began to reenter export markets that it had
not utilized in over a decade. West Germany developed important trade partnerships with
other countries, most notably Austria, as the rest of Europe needed Germany’s newly
accessed productivity and economic growth to recover themselves. West Germany had
surpluses of food and goods that other European countries desperately needed, which
only grew during the 50s as the economy became stronger and stronger. West Germany
exported large amounts to assist European recovery in addition to making its reparations
payments. In recognizing that peace was their best option, West Germany voluntarily
entered into economic and political partnerships, providing increased stability and mutual
economic stimulation. This is illustrated by the uniting of the European Steel and Coal
communities in 1951, which laid the groundwork for the founding of the European Union
in 1993. Six major European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands) agreed to run their heavy industries under a common management
to assure that countries cannot make weapons to fight against other European nations, as
was the case in the past (European Union, 2018). This united these six European
countries economically and politically, setting common goals for economic success and
lasting peace (European Union, 2018). West Germany also joined NATO in 1955,
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cementing their long-term goals of peaceful relationships and interdependencies with the
rest of Europe. In joining NATO, West Germany showed that it was more than willing to
defend other member countries from unwelcome Soviet political advances, displaying its
dedication to free-market capitalist economies and trade. Elimination of Nazi regulations
and adopting pro-market reforms proved to be extremely profitable for West Germany
and Europe as a whole. In contrast, the heavily regulated East German economy, plagued
by Soviet communist controls and economically distant from most of the West, stagnated
and ultimately failed.
Another explanation of West Germany’s post-war economic growth can be found
in productivity convergence. German productivity finally converged to British levels in
1960 after trailing British GDP per man by at least 25% until 1950 (Ritschl &
Eichengreen, 2009, p. 213). The lower output-per-worker ratio, explained by WWI,
inflation, and the Great Depression, kept German GDP at relatively low levels until it was
able to converge properly. This is also supported by Temin’s research in Western Europe
economic growth after WWII, in which he found that “Movement from agriculture to
industry the larger a country’s share of employment in agriculture – his proxy for delayed
structural change – the faster its growth” (Ritschl & Eichengreen, 2009, p. 193).
The final reason for the strong levels of growth is the lack of strong industrial and
financial restrictions of the Allied Powers in the years following WWII and the extended
reparations payment plan, which extended to 2010, when the UK announced that
Germany had made its final reparations payments. This allowed for mostly unhindered
economic growth stimulated by Allied economic assistance. All these arguments,
however, have some form of inherent validity, meaning that most likely the fairest
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argument is that it was a combination of all these factors that allowed for the economic
growth.
Differences in the Approach of Foreign Powers
There were large differences in the approach of foreign powers that assisted
Germany in being so successful and economically independent. The first is that instead of
loans, the vast majority of the Marshall Plan assistance came in the form of gifts. Just as
America’s loans to Germany in the years preceding the Great Depression stimulated the
German economy, the influx of strong foreign currency from the Marshall Plan and the
rest of the Allied powers following WWII greatly assisted the German economy.
However, the US government recognized that gifts would be far more valuable for all
nations in the long run and that the recovery of Europe would be directly linked with the
recovery of Germany. With gifts instead of loans, West Germany (along with the other
recipients of Marshall Plan assistance) would be able to purchase foreign goods,
stimulating jobs and production across Europe and the US. In doing so, nations would not
suffer the large employment drop that characterized the years following World War I
(Toussaint, 2006).
The second difference was the implementation of a firm and viable plan for
repayment and foreign control of monetary policy that would still allow for economic
growth and employment. After WWI, Germany was beaten down with unrealistic
reparations payments that, when coupled with the horrific internal fiscal decisions, ruined
the economy. Understanding that supporting the German economy was the best decision
for Europe resulted in helpful controls being placed and assistance being lent to the
German people, including stimulating production of domestic industry in order to reduce
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its reliance on imports (Toussaint, 2006). Instead of just taking as much money as
possible from Germany, Potsdam called for smaller payments over a large period of time
which would stabilize the economy, leading to political stability as well. This would also
allow for the recovery of foreign nations, as more money would be able to be taken from
Germany over an extended period of time while not eliminating its purchasing and
industrial power.
Another difference was the uniting of Western Europe as a collective whole that
had to recover rather than separating countries in terms of inherent wartime badness or
goodness. In beating down the German economy through huge war reparations, it was
unable to fully recover and as a result discontent and anger grew as Germany felt
alienated and mistreated after WWI. The simplistic view of taking as much as possible
from one country that had done wrong and giving as much as possible to the countries
that were innocent had proved to be incredibly flawed. In contrast, Europe as a whole had
to be united and lifted up in order to successfully recover (Toussaint, 2006). In linking
the economies of all Western European countries through foreign aid and gifting them
capital to purchase foreign goods, Western Europe was able to work together to
experience a period of peace and growth together.
WWII Conclusion and Summary
After WWI, Germany’s people were starving, they were heavily reliant on foreign
loans, their currency was worthless, and their government was extremely unstable,
engineering a perfect climate for the rise of Adolf Hitler. In the late 1950s and 60s,
however, West Germany had the strongest economy in Western Europe if not one of the
strongest in the world. They had booming industry, strong currency, and were extremely
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independent, limiting their reliance on imports and stimulating domestic production. If
Germany’s post-WWI failures (notably hyperinflation and Hitler’s rise) are mainly
attributed to internal decision making within the German government, it seems only fair
that Germany be attributed with most of its post-WWII economic successes.
The German economy succeeded for several key internal reasons. The first of
these reasons was post-war productivity shock. After the war, Germany began to repair
its infrastructure and regain access to its full productive and industrial capacity. German
productive capacity was never truly eliminated during the war, and was still much higher
than before the war started. The German government devoted large amounts of
manpower and capital to its infrastructure, and it was quickly repaired (including the
bottleneck sectors that the Allies had destroyed). As a result, employment and worker
productivity rose, allowing Germany to regain its productive potential and transfer its
large wartime economic potential to domestic industry.
Germany was further able to become more efficient by moving from peasant
agriculture to non-wartime industry and more efficient large-scale modern agriculture. As
Germany was forced to provide food for its starving people and the large number of
Allied soldiers occupying it while concurrently stimulating industry, it became more
efficient with its agriculture while simultaneously moving much of its population to
domestic industry.
These changes were also supported by Erhard’s currency reforms and decontrol of
prices, leading into the next reason for German economic growth and stimulation:
institutional changes and monetary policy reforms. These reforms began with
denazification, as the new German government and Allied powers sought to remove all
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Nazi influence from all areas of the government. Ludwig Erhard, a staunch anti-Nazi
Bavarian economist, was tasked with reforming monetary policy. This became
manifested in radical changes, including complete currency reform and adoption of the
deutschemark, decontrol of prices, removal of rationing, and the lowering of the high tax
rates characteristic of large wartime expenditures. These pro-market reforms revitalized
the economy, incentivizing sellers, lowering unemployment and absenteeism while
simultaneously raising productivity, and ending food shortages. The economy quickly
became highly stabilized, incentivized, and productive as Erhard’s free-market policies
took the place of the Nazi controls. This is closely related to the productivity convergence
highlighted earlier. Germany suffered from low levels of output-per-worker due to WWI,
hyperinflation, and the Great Depression. This kept German GDP and low levels as it
sought to fully fight off the adverse effects for decades. As noted earlier, the German
GDP began to converge after WWII, partially due to the large movement from agriculture
to industry and the increase of worker productivity and motivation due to monetary
stability.
The early German economy, and the later West German economy, was further
stimulated and stabilized by its cohesion with the rest of Western Europe. In order to
reach its immense productive capacity in the years following the war, it was forced to
look for export markets that were willing to buy German goods in order to rebuild. The
abundance of demand for German goods allowed it to increase production and lower
unemployment in order create the supply needed to meet this demand as well as
strengthen trade alliances. West Germany also entered peaceful alliances with foreign
powers through NATO and the uniting of Europe’s steel and coal economies that
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provided political stability, assisting West Germany in its goal of maintaining long-term
peace and stabilizing its economy.
This is not to say that West Germany did not receive substantial help from the
Allied powers, especially the United States. The Allies did help a great deal; however,
their most effective assistance came in the form of simply letting the German economy
grow without major interference (with the exception of the Marshall Plan and
government stabilization). The lack of unnecessary restrictions on the German economy
allowed the economy to grow and prosper without the interference that plagued it during
the years after WWI. The extended reparations payments and the way that they mirrored
the health of the German economy helped stimulate growth and economic stability in
order to utilize Germany’s productive and economic prowess to boost Europe as a whole.
It also enabled Germany to pay its reparations payments over an extended period of time,
providing the countries it had wronged with a steady stream of capital that could be used
to rebuild. Another key form of assistance from the Allied powers in Germany came from
the stabilization of the government and economy immediately after the war. This aid
manifested itself in assistance with the election process, denazification of the
government, stimulation of food production, military presence to maintain peace, and
financial aid. This allowed Germany to recover quicker and more rapidly than would
have been expected if it was operating on its own and successfully remove Hitler’s
authoritarian influences on German institutions. The Marshall Plan also greatly assisted
German rebuilding of infrastructure, especially the fact that almost all of the financial aid
was in the form of gifts rather than loans. This meant that Allied assistance did not raise
the amount of German debt and result in a situation similar to the US loans being recalled
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when the Great Depression hit. In lifting up the German economy through the influx of
strong foreign currency, all of Europe was able to experience Germany’s substantial
economic contribution after the war. This (along with NATO) also brought Western
Europe as a whole closer together, providing it with a common enemy: Communism. The
treaties and conferences following the war as well as the Marshall Plan sought to unite
Western Europe politically and economically in order to promote sustained and lasting
peace.
Despite these crucial external contributions, the unparalleled success of the West
German economy can mostly be attributed to internal German policies, reforms, and
productivity. As easy as it would be to attribute Wirtschaftswunder to the efforts of the
Allied Powers, that simply would not be true. Although the programs and the changing of
the approach as a whole of the Allied Powers assisted Germany, Germany itself was
responsible for stabilization of their currency and raising their production levels and
efficiency to match their pre-existing capacity after the war. Unlike after WWI, they did
not allow themselves to be over dependent on the US and other world powers; instead,
they implemented moderate protectionist policies regarding imports, pro-market reforms,
and moved much of their workforce from agriculture to industry.
Although several of Germany’s successful pro-market plans were at first
suggested and implemented immediately after the war by the Allied powers to make sure
Germany would not completely starve or develop war potential, it was free-market
Germans such as Ludwig Erhard who adopted them and perfected them, coupling them
with currency reform and complete restructuring of German financial institutions. Many
changes were actually contrary to the initially Allied vision of German monetary policy,
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such as the elimination of price controls and rationing in order to stimulate workforce
participation and food production. Even the controls that were suggested by the Allied
Powers were later completely entrusted to the German government to monitor after it was
deemed strong and established. Besides balancing out the economy immediately after the
war, ensuring that Germany could not develop a war potential (along with Marshall Plan
aid obviously), and supervising reparations payments, the Allies were actually quite
detached from the majority of West German economic controls as early as 1950.
There was also never truly a point where the Allied Powers had the full control
over the German finance departments and the German economy, and if there ever was, it
was only immediately after the war and for an extremely short period of time. Instead,
they worked in a supportive role to help strengthen the new anti-Nazi German
government. Although the Allies maintained a strong military presence there to resist the
Soviet-led expansion of communism, West Germany was declared to have the “full
authority of a sovereign state over its internal and external affairs” at the Convention on
Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, just
10 years after their WWII surrender (Junker, 2011, p. 117). This is quite notable,
especially when one considers the fact that Germany had singlehandedly started the two
the largest wars in the modern era in a span of just 25 years and the Allied powers
therefore were forced to take every possible precaution to make sure Germany would not
have the opportunity to repeat its actions. The Marshall Plan, while assisting Germany,
also cannot be entirely attributed with the German economic miracle, as many Americans
have attempted to do.
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Marshall Plan aid to West Germany was not that large. Cumulative aid
from the Marshall Plan and other aid programs totaled only $2 billion
through October 1954. Even in 1948 and 1949, when aid was at its peak,
Marshall Plan aid was less than 5 percent of German national income.
Other countries that received substantial Marshall Plan aid exhibited lower
growth than Germany. Moreover, while West Germany was receiving aid,
it was also making reparations and restitution payments well in excess of
$1 billion. (Henderson, 2018).
In fact, it was actually the lack of interference in the German economy that also assisted
its growth and the growth of Europe as a whole, further supporting Adam Smith’s
capitalistic ideas of the invisible hand and free market self-regulation.
Final Conclusion
As stated previously, the goal of humanity should be to promote peace and
stability and make the recovery of devastated countries as easy as possible. Therefore,
there is a duty for strong foreign powers after wars to help devastated countries recover
and regain stability and health. A large part of this involves engineering climates that
stimulate economic growth and stability to supply domestic jobs, providing food for
citizens of that country, and providing opportunities to repair the infrastructure. This duty
does not entail choosing which countries recover and which countries stay buried in
economic hardships; rebuilding a continent devastated by war necessitates rebuilding the
individual countries and economies within it and making sure they are stable upon
leaving them. This is of the utmost importance because economic stability can directly be
linked to political stability; in making comparisons to the US forces in the Middle East

WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER

44

during the Gulf and Iraq War, unrest has been prevalent in countries that the US
interferes in then withdraws from because there is a lack of economic and political
stability, leaving the door open for tyranny and authoritarian rule.
There were opportunities to learn from their mistakes that proved to be extremely
beneficial for both Germany and the Allied powers. Germany learned valuable lessons
about restricting inflation and maintaining currency valuation through free market
policies. It learned that in departing from what gave their currency value (in the case of
WWI, it was the gold standard) they could not spend large amounts (especially with
money it did not have and with an unmotivated workforce) without its currency losing its
value. Erhard realized that in order for Germany to recover and be completely denazified,
it would have to shed the Nazi price and rationing controls as well as the high tax rate
that would keep businesses from being stimulated. A more reasonable tax rate would
actually stimulate recover and allow for more money to be collected in the long-run as
less businesses would default and go bankrupt. Germany also learned that overreliance on
a single/few outside powers for economic stability and rebuilding had the potential to
result in economic failure, especially during time of economic crises. In reducing its
dependence on foreign loans from a single nation and imports and becoming more selfsufficient, it would be responsible for its own success. In WWI, Germany was ruled by
others, whether that be as a result of reparations payments or its unwise decision to take
on large amounts of foreign debt. In the years following WWII, it made the decision to be
self-ruled, reducing the variance and uncertainty that can arise when over-dependent on
foreign currency or governments for assistance. Germany recognized that it still needed
strong foreign currency to combat any possibility of inflation as well as access its full
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productive capacity. To replace overreliance on a single outside power to support these
needs, such as loans from the US after WWI, it developed intricate economic
interdependencies and trade partnerships with many other strong European countries as
well as America and eliminated its isolationist trade policies that had existed for decades.
It stimulated foreign trade and exports, bringing in strong foreign capital while
simultaneously accessing demand to match its productive capacity and supply of goods.
Although the Allies cannot be blamed for directly causing Germany’s economic
failure and hyperinflation (these can solely be attributed to decisions made internally
within German institutions), Germany would never have been able to truly be successful
with the reparations payments and heavy economic interference. The lack of a strong and
viable reparations payment plan brought a lack of clarity, bringing more economic
instability as German businesses were unsure of how the reparations payments would
affect the economy as a whole. When the reparations payments were announced, they
were immediately deemed to be impossible to pay by experts, adding to the further
instability and trust in the German economy. While hyperinflation began before the
reparations payments and the reparations payments did not necessitate hyperinflation, it
limited whatever possible options Germany did have, regardless of how minimal they
were. In refusing to help Germany recover in order to bring both political and economic
stability and realistic payment plans, the Allies in the German economy that ultimately
led to severe unrest and the rise of Adolf Hitler. This lack of necessary aid in Germany’s
recovery also further delayed the rest of Europe’s recovery because the Allies attempted
to be selective in which countries it wanted to recover after WWI; they beat down
Germany in attempts to get as much money as possible to give to the countries that it had

WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER

46

perceived to have been innocent. Western Europe was starved of Germany’s purchasing
power and production of goods, and it later paid the price of the lack of stability when
Hitler took power and Germany began WWII.
The Allies changed their approach to post-war aid and European economic
recovery. They learned that, in attempting to rebuild Europe, it could not be selective on
the countries it wanted to recover and those it wanted to punish due to the strong
interdependencies that exist between the various European economies. It realized that, by
design, Europe was united in ways that far superseded political agendas or wartime
alliances, and in recognizing this unity, it was evident that Europe as a whole would have
to be stimulated and assisted in order to be most effective in its recovery from WWII. It
also realized that in punishing a country through economic instability and hardships, it
would therefore be engineering a climate perfect for political instability and other issues.
Economic instability, especially when it can be attributed to a foreign nation and is
perceived as unjust (whether or not it is truly a result of the foreign power), leads to
discontentment, internal turmoil, frustration, anger, and desperation which become more
and more difficult to control. In the interests of creating lasting peace, the Allies realized
that supporting economic recovery would be directly linked to peace and stability. The
Allies placed very moderate sanctions on the economy, as stated, to limit wartime
potential and assist in financial decisions without interfering with economic growth. The
reparations payments, never more than 5% of Germany’s export value, were designed to
mirror the health of the German economy. The controls the Allies implemented when
Germany was at its weakest were given to the German people as soon as possible to make
sure it was clear that Germany would be responsible for its own success or failure. The
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controls the Allies implemented when Germany was at its weakest were given to the
German people as soon as possible to make sure it was clear that Germany would be
responsible for its own success or failure. Supporting economic recovery and refraining
from implementing unnecessary controls, convincing Germany that they would be
responsible for their own success or failure, brought a complete change in the Zeitgeist,
translated directly as the “spirit of the age” or “spirit of the time” The post WWII
Zeitgeist was characterized by feelings of hope, stability, contentment, and security
instead of the pre-WWI feelings of anger, frustration, humiliation, and hatred. It is these
post-WWII dominant feelings such as these that helped bring long term peace to West
Germany. The Allies also learned that its aid to Germany would be most profitable in the
form of gifts, not loans. In restricting the amount of debt Germany was in and assisting in
its recovery, the Allies were therefore able to take advantage of Germany’s purchasing of
American goods and productivity, proving to be much more valuable in the long run than
repayment of loans that would restrict growth and purchasing power. The Marshall Plan
was a fantastic example of this; in providing no-strings-attached financial aid to
countries, they were able to recover quicker, stimulating trade and productivity which
America and the UK were therefore able to take advantage of. Although this was not the
main cause of the success, it certainly assisted Germany’s economic growth. The Allies
also realized that for a country to experience unhindered growth, it therefore must not be
limited by unnecessary interference. In keeping reparations payments lower and
extending the payment plan over a longer period of time, the German economy was able
to grow and reach its untapped productivity levels. Also, in eliminating the tariffs on
German goods that existed in the years following WWI as a way of punishing Germany
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for its wrongdoings, the German economy was able to grow and develop important trade
relationships that benefitted all of Western Europe as a whole.
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